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1 Introdution
We refer to trade nane as either a) one of the mehanisms provided by nanial institutions and governments
to failitate international trade ativities, or b) an agreement whereby a ustomer an purhase goods on
aount, paying the supplier at a later date. When trade ours aross borders, sometimes sellers require
either ash-in-advane payments or formal guarantees to over themselves from the possibility of default
or insolveny of their buyers. Importers are usually fored to turn to loans or letters of redit to satisfy
exporter requirements before having their orders shipped. Most of these ontrats are provided by nanial
institutions and require some form of ollateral. Other times, when the goods are delivered, a trade redit
is given for a spei number of days30, 60 or 90and it is reorded in the aounts reeivable setion of
the rm's balane sheet.
Trade nane is an extremely important piee of the international trade mehanism; estimates nd that
around 90% of international trade relies on some form of redit (Auboin, 2009). Yet relative to its importane
in the atual workings of trade, very little attention had been devoted until reently to the study of the
onnetion between trade nane and international trade performane in either the theoretial or empirial
literature. The "great trade ollapse, the dramati fall in the trade-to-GDP ratio during the urrent nanial
risis, hanged that. In spite of these eorts, there is still little onsensus on the eets of trade nane on
maroeonomi variables and, speially, on international trade performane.
We make a theoretial ontribution to this debate within the framework of an International Real Busi-
ness Cyle (IRBC) model. We propose a dynami, quantitative, miro-founded maroeonomi model that
builds on the standard model of IRBC proposed by Bakus et al. (1992) (BKK). We introdue an additional
requirement for importers, who must borrow proportionally to the value of the goods they wish to import.
This feature enables us to shed some light on the role of redit in international trade performane.
Our model provides some relevant improvements over standard IRBC models. Indeed, imports are more
volatile than GDP, our quantitative analysis does not suer from the onsumption/output anomaly (i.e.,
GDP ross-ountry orrelation is larger than onsumption ross-ountry orrelation, as in the data), and the
volatilities of onsumption, imports, and terms of trade relative to GDP are lose to those in reent US data.
The latter is a property that, as far as we know, required the introdution of non-standard preferenes into
the model of IRBCs (Rao, 2008). The nanially onstrained eonomy produes negative orrelations for
net exports and terms of trade with national output. These orrelations are found to be positive in standard
IRBC models, opposite to data.
Using a ounterfatual analysis we test the maroeonomi eets of alterations in the availability of
nane to importers. Compared to a produtivity shok of the same size, we nd that trade nane does not
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appear to have a large eet on the behavior of maroeonomi aggregates over the business yle. However,
reent empirial literature show that, indeed, redit shoks aount for a large share of the utuations of
maromagnitudes, as large as produtivity shoks, suggesting that volatility is, indeed, muh larger (See, for
instane, Niepmann and Shmidt-Eisenlohr (2014), Helbling et al. (2011) and Hristov et al. (2012)). More-
over, our model onludes that long term variations in trade nane do have the potential to ause signiant
deviations in trade and eonomi performane. On the one hand, a negative redit shok redues the ability
of a produer to use foreign inputs, thereby reduing eieny, whih negatively aets aggregate prodution.
On the other hand, it also stimulates demand for domesti goods, making them more expensive and harder
to ome by in foreign markets and reduing exports as well. The net eet on the trade balane is positive,
whih together with higher demand for domesti goods from onstrained importers alleviates the fall in GDP.
Hene, trade falls faster than GDP in our model following a redit shok. However, unless the variane of
redit shoks is muh larger than that of produtivity shoks, these eets appear to be small in omparison
to the eets of produtivity shoks, whih remain the main drivers of business yles in our model. Finally,
we also nd that more nanially developed ountries trade more, have higher levels and lower volatility in
GDP and onsumption, onsistent with the empirial evidene in this area (Kose et al. (2003b, 2006)).
In the following setion we oer a literature review. Setion 3 presents the model setup and denes
an equilibrium of the theoretial eonomy. Setion 4 presents a number of international real-business yle
statistis that we want to apture with our model. We use these numbers to alibrate the model and then test
its numerial properties. Setion 5 ontains our main results. We explore the eets of temporary variations
in trade nane as well as to permanent hanges in nanial development and how they aet the dynami
properties of international trade in the short and in the long run. Setion 6 onludes.
2 Literature Review
International trade dynamis have been largely analyzed in both the theoretial and the empirial literature.
Unfortunately, this literature has largely disregarded the onnetion between trade nane and international
trade performane; the few exeptions have mostly negleted the important role of export insurane provided
by nanial institutions and redit oered by suppliers to their ustomers via open aounts.
A number of papers (for instane Chaney (2005); Manova (2012); Manova et al. (2009)) have foused on
the internal and external nane of xed osts but they have largely ignored the important role of export
insurane via trade nane. One important exeption is Ahn (2011), who provides a theoretial model of
trade nane to explain the great trade ollapse. His main onlusions are two: First, international trade
takes plae in a more risky environment ompared to domesti trade and, as a onsequene, it is subjet to
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more demanding nanial onditions, a result also sustained in Ellingsen and Vlahos (2009). Seond, higher
risk makes international trade nane more eonomially-sensitive and it beomes muh more pro-ylial
than domesti trade nane. Having these results in mind, we simplify and assume that nane is required
only for international transations.
A reent paper on IRBCs that onsiders the nanial setor is Kalemli-Ozan et al. (2012). They explore
the impliations of nanial integration for international business-yle synhronization. Their empirial
analysis onludes that nanial integration enhanes ross-border o-movement during nanial turmoils,
demonstrating the importane of the nanial hannel as a mehanism of ontagion. On the theoretial part,
they onstrut a dynami stohasti general equilibrium model where rms need external resoures to nane
working apital and this dependene is determinant to produe GDP ross-orrelations onsistent with their
empirial results. However, they do not aount for the nanial needs for trade ativities and disregard
international trade patterns in the analysis.
There is very little data available on trade nane and trade redit, and that what is available is not very
reliable either. Auboin (2009) nds that around 90% of international trade relies in some form of redit.
Asmundson et al. (2011) estimate from four surveys arried out among banks of all sizes and nationalities
between 2008 and 2010 that between 35%-40% of international redit was naned by banks, around 20%
was paid in advane (and may have been naned by letters of redit) and between 38% and 45% relied
on open aounts, although 25% of these open aounts were overed by Berne Union members insurane.
Mora and Powers (2009) attribute a larger share to open aounts (40-80%) and a possibly smaller share to
banks (10-50%), though they onede the role of bank naning is inreased if one inludes working-apital
loans. These large intervals illustrate the limitations in the availability of data about trade nane. Whatever
the preise numbers are, the one thing that is lear is that trade nane is a hugely relevant fator for anyone
in the business of importing or exporting goods.
The sarity of good data is the main ause for the lak of empirial researh on this topi. Following
the 2008 nanial risis, however, this literature has ontributed to underline the importane of trade nane
for the dynamis of trade and hinted at some of its main properties, and so that, we detail some empirial
ndings in the present setion.
One of the most reent and omplete empirial studies for its data overage has been onduted by the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS (2014)). Its Study Group makes a detailed review of available data
on trade nane for developed and emerging ountries. Then, they proeed to ombine it with informa-
tion from trade assoiations and SWIFT and reate a panel of 18 major trade ountries from 1999 to 2012.
Although they reognize that the approah requires signiant interpolation and inferene to get a general
haraterisation of the size, struture and trends of the global market, they are able to extrat some rele-
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vant onlusions: bank-intermediated trade nane fell sharply in the quarters immediately after Lehman
bankrupty, often at rates omparable to delines in the value of trade; and redued trade nane availability
may have aounted for up to one-fth of the deline in trade volumes in the aftermath of the shok.
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Another relevant work isAsmundson et al. (2011). They use survey data to onrm that banks were
inreasingly autious with real-setor ustomers and ounter-party banks during the reent risis and admit
to have inreased their loans-deposits priing margins. Most banks (with the exeption of the group of large
banks, whih indeed, aounts for a substantial majority of the trade nane share) denied having dereased
redit availability in their own institutions, but all onrm they inreased their demands for ollateral and
adopted striter risk management praties in response to higher risk. Moreover, they argue that exporters
have beome more risk averse, seeking higher protetion from risk and avoiding open aounts. The latter
behavior has fored importers to turn to formal redit more often. Hene, the share of world trade supported
by bank intermediation has inreased onsiderably. Morel (2010) nds similar results using Berne Union
data.
Shott (2009) and Fontagné and Gaulier (2009) show how nanial rises aet the volume of exports and
imports muh more than the range of varieties exhanged. This suggests that, during nanial disruptions,
rms redue their sale of international ativities although they are able to maintain their international
hannels open. Another interesting empirial analysis in favor of the nanial hannel is Van der Veer (2010).
He fouses on the role of private trade insurers, who faed mounting risks after Lehman Brothers bankrupty.
He nds that, on average, every ¿1 of insured exports generates ¿2.3 of total exports. Thus, the impat on
trade of a hange in the supply of private trade redit insurane is bigger than the hange in the value of
insured trade: trade redit insurane improves a buyer's aess to supplier redit.
There is, however, some skeptiism about the role trade nane played during the great trade ollapse,
espeially in the US. Levhenko et al. (2011) and Eaton et al. (2011) attribute most of the deline in trade
to demand shoks and ompositional eets. Nevertheless, this lak of onsensus may be explained by the
fous of the literature on US rms due to data availability; key results may be driven by speial features
of this ountry. In fat, Eaton et al. (2009) do nd that for ountries like Japan or China nanial shoks
are the largest ontributors to hanges in trade over GDP ratio. Also, a number of studies nd that small
and medium enterprises in developing ountries were espeially aeted by the shortage in trade nane
(Malouhe, 2009; Humphrey, 2009; Berman and Martin, 2010).
Most data sets do not disentangle banking nane from inter-rm nane and none of them apture the
relative share of intrarm redit in dierent setors and ountries. As a onsequene they make it diult
1
They use data from 11 of the 18 ountries in the GMM panel data analysis: Australia, Brazil, Frane, Germany, Hong Kong,
India, Italy, Korea, Spain, UK and US.
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to separate ause and eet. An exeption to these limitations in the data is Amiti and Weinstein (2011),
who use a unique data-set for Japan whih mathes rms with their redit banking providers to examine the
link between nane and exports during the Japanese nanial rises of the nineties. They are the rst to
establish a ausal link from shoks in the nanial setor to exporters that result in exports delining muh
faster than output during banking rises. Their evidene shows that rms that rely more on trade nane are
hit muh harder when the nanial institutions they rely upon run into trouble. These results are robust to a
large number of variations in the speiation of their model. Paravisini et al. (2011) oer further empirial
evidene for the supply-side eets of nane on international trade. They arry out an analysis similar to
Amiti and Weinstein (2011) with Peruvian data.
Ahn et al. (2011) argue against the view that the trade nane hannel has been of little relevane to the
deline in trade during the risis. They laim that the onventional measures of external nane dependene
that are ommonly used in the literature are ompletely unrelated with levels of trade nane. Moreover,
they show that: First, during the risis, export pries rose relative to domesti manufaturing pries aross a
large number of ountries. Seond, import and export pries of goods shipped by sea, whih are likely to be
aeted most by trade nane ontrations, rose disproportionately more than those shipped by air or land.
Indeed, Feenstra et al. (2011) also show that the trade nane hannel is quite a dierent hannel than that
of the onventional external nane hannel. Finally, a reent paper by Niepmann and Shmidt-Eisenlohr
(2014) fouses on trade nane through letters of redit. They analyse the eets of ountry level shoks on
the supply of letters of redit and nd a signiant and sizeable eet of them on international trade.
Berman et al. (2012) also support the latter thesis with a theoretial model and an empirial analysis.
They run a historial analysis from 1950 to 2009 for a large number of ountries and nd a robust time-to-ship
eet, i.e., exporters reat to an inrease in the probability of default of importers by inreasing their export
prie and dereasing their export volumes to the destination in risis. They onlude that this stylized fat
of nanial rises strongly suggests that they aet trade, not only beause they impat demand, but also
through nanial fritions whih are spei to international trade.
3 The model eonomy
Let there be two ountries, we denote foreign ountry variables by an asterisk. Countries will be idential
exept for the stream of produtivity shoks they reeive. A ountry onsists of four types of agents:
1. Innitely lived households taking deisions every period about their optimal levels of onsumption,
leisure, investment, and savings. Households are the only agents in this eonomy taking inter-temporal
deisions, and so are the ultimate holders of savings and debt in the model.
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2. Final-good rms put together a basket of domestially produed intermediate goods; their output
is a nal good that an be used for onsumption or the aumulation of apital by households. Final
goods are sold domestially in perfetly ompetitive markets.
3. Intermediate good rms, on the other hand, operate in a monopolistially ompetitive setting. They
use a xed amount of labor eah period to ombine domesti and foreign inputs and manufature their
goods. The amount of foreign inputs they use in prodution is limited by how muh they an borrow
to nane their imports. How muh they produe depends also on their produtivity level, whih is
aeted by a random produtivity shok.
4. Prodution inputs are bought from domesti and foreign input produers, who ombine apital and
labor in their prodution proess. They an sell their produts in domesti markets or export to foreign
intermediate good produers.
Finanial intermediaries are not expliitly modeled in this paper.
2
We assume ompetitive nanial inter-
mediaries hannel household savings to intermediate good produers, who require nanial support to aess
to imported input goods. They do so in suh a way that default is never an optimal hoie for borrowers.
Household savings are pooled aross ountries, so it is possible for a household to lend to a foreign interme-
diate good produer. This allows for unbalaned trade in the model. Negative household savings imply that
rms are borrowing more than they ould obtain in domesti savings markets.
Though there are important dierenes between formal borrowing from nanial institutions and trade
redit (as pointed out in the introdution), we will not treat them separately in the model. In both ases trade
nane allows for a variation of risk-sharing ongurations between importer and exporter. However, most
of the reviewed literature agrees on the substitutability between both types of naning (Fisman and Love
(2003); Iaovone and Zavaka (2009); Garia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013)). It seems that this
substitutability is espeially important when nanial disruptions appear (Wilner, 2000), as importers move
from formal loans to aounts payable, oered by their foreign suppliers, when banks tighten redit availabil-
ity. Or the other way around: importers turn to banks when their suppliers are relutant to risk with aounts
reeivable from their foreign ustomers. Some authors also suggest both forms of redit are omplementary
(Love et al., 2007) in that large and well-reputed rms have easier aess to redit issued by nanial institu-
tions and play the role of trade nane reditors to their ustomers, alloating banking redit they obtained
via aounts reeivable. In view of the aforementioned surveys outome, we fous on the substitutability
2
For a model that expliitly models trade nane see Ahn (2011). In his model, banks have aess to asymmetri information
on their ustomers and an inur osts to improve this information. However, information is of less quality when the ustomer
performs international transations. Sine importers or exporters depend on foreign rms' suess and reliability to pay bak
their loans, poorer information quality makes them riskier for banks. We bypass this by assuming redit is required only for
trade with foreigners.
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between them and we do not disentangle banking setor nane from inter-rm nane.
We now proeed to outline in detail the optimizing behavior of eah agent in the model as well as the
resulting equilibrium.
3.1 Households
Eah ountry has a mass 1 of idential households, who enjoy onsumption and leisure every period. Their
utility at eah period is given by a stritly onave funtion u(ct, 1−nt), where ct is onsumption and nt the
fration of the time household members spend at work. Furthermore, households must hoose how muh they
invest in new apital (it) and how muh they lend to importers (st). There is a small ost of holding savings
in the form of redit to importers equal to
φ
2 s
2
t−1.
3
Household earnings ome from the salaries they pereive
for the amount of time they spend at work (wt), from the share of prots they reeive from intermediate
good rms (πt), the interest they are paid on their savings (rt), and the rents that arue to them from
input produers who rent the apital they own (Rt). Putting it all together we obtain the household's budget
onstraint for eah period:
ct + it + st +
φ
2
s2t−1 ≤ wtnt + πt + st−1(1 + rt) +Kt−1Rt, ∀t. (1)
Physial apital is subjet to depreiation at rate δ every period. Following Bakus and Cruini (2000),
physial apital formation is subjet to adjustment osts, whih are aptured by a funtion Ψ(·), whih
satises Ψ > 0, Ψ′ > 0, and Ψ′′ < 0. Capital evolves aording to
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +Ψ(it/Kt-1)Kt−1, (2)
We use Ψ(i/k) = (i/k)ψ, ψ ∈ (0, 1), so investment is desribed by the hange in apital stoks as follows:
it =
(
Kt
Kt−1
− (1 − δ)
) 1
ψ
Kt-1.
3
This ost serves for the purpose of determining the steady-state value of the asset position in a zero-order approximation
without the need of taking seond-order approximations and ensuring stationarity. See Benigno (2009) and Heathote and Perri
(2002) for detailed disussions. It does not have any other impliation for our results.
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If households disount utility from future periods at rate β, optimizing behavior is desribed by the following
problem:
max
{ct,nt,st,Kt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− nt) (3)
s.t. (1) and (2).
We an re-write this problem as:
max
{nt,st,Kt}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
wtnt +Πt +Kt−1Rt + st−1(1 + rt)− it − st −
φ
2
s2t−1, 1− nt
)
and obtain the following rst order onditions:
wtuc,t = −un,t,
uc,t = β(1 + rt+1 − φst)uc,t+1,
1
ψ
(
i
Kt−1
)1−ψ
uc,t = β
(
Rt+1 −
it+1
Kt
+
1
ψ
(
it+1
Kt
)1−ψ
Kt+1
Kt
)
uc,t+1.
Letting u(c, 1− n) = [cµ(1− n)1−µ]θ/θ, the marginal utilities of onsumption and labor are given by
uc,t = µc
θµ−1
t (1− nt)
θ(1−µ),
un,t = −(1− µ)c
θµ
t (1 − nt)
θ(1−µ)−1.
3.2 Final-good rms
Final good rms are homogeneous and they partiipate in a ompetitive market, so they at as prie takers
and make zero prot. They put together a basket of intermediate goods to reate a nal good. Their
prodution funtion is
Yt =
(ˆ 1
0
dσj,tdj
)1\σ
, (4)
where dj,t denotes their demand of intermediate good j. Prots are given by Πt = Yt −
´ 1
0 dj,tpj,tdj. Maxi-
mizing prots gives their optimal demand of eah variety of intermediate goods, whih is
dj,t = Ytp
1
σ−1
j,t . (5)
3.3 Intermediate-good rms (importers)
Eah ountry has a mass 1 of rms produing dierentiated, non-tradable goods. These rms operate in
a monopolisti ompetition setting; we want importers to have some benets they an use as ollateral to
10
obtain redit. Produtivity is given by a random shok zt ommon to all rms, and prodution takes plae
aording to the funtion:
Fj,t = zth
α
j,tx
1−α
j,t , α ∈ (0, 1),
where hj,t represents the demand of domesti inputs and xj,t the demand of imported inputs of rm j. Firms
pay a xed ost Q units of labor to operate every period. Prots for the intermediate good produer are
given by
πj,t = pj,tdj,t − Pthj,t − (1 + rt)P
∗
t xj,t −Qwt, (6)
where input pries are denoted by Pt and P
∗
t , while the intermediate good's market prie is pj,t. Note that
the rm must borrow in order to buy imported inputs and therefore also pays an interest rt over their total
ost. Sine imports are bought on redit they are subjet to a trade redit onstraint. We think of the degree
η˜ to whih ontrats an be enfored as summarizing the average quality of enforement in a given eonomy.
The nanial intermediary behaves ompetitively. A redit onstraint states that it must be individually
rational for the managers to repay their loan. When they abide by the ontrat, managers reeive their net
inome. When they default, they eonomize on the payment they owe the intermediary but lose fration η˜
of the resulting resoures. i.e.
πj,t ≥ (1− η˜) [πj,t + (1 + rt)P
∗
t xj,t] ,
η˜
1− η˜
πj,t ≥ (1 + rt)P
∗
t xj,t,
η (pj,tdj,t − Pthj,t −Qwt) ≥ (1 + η)(1 + rt)P
∗
t xj,t, (7)
where η = η˜1−η˜ . Suppose the rm has already hosen a prie pj,t induing demand dj,t. Taking them as given,
the ombination of domesti and foreign inputs that minimize the ost of satisfying this demand is given by
min
hj,t,xj,t
Pthj,t + (1 + rt)P
∗
t xj,t (8)
s.t.
zth
α
j,tx
1−α
j,t = dj,t,
η (pj,tdj,t − Pthj,t −Qwt) ≥ (1 + η)(1 + rt)P
∗
t xj,t.
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Kuhn-Tuker onditions (KTCs) with Lagrangian multipliers ζt and ξt are:
(1− ξj,tη)Pthj,t = αζj,tdj,t,
(1 − ξj,t(1 + η))(1 + rt)P
∗
t xj,t = (1− α)ζj,tdj,t,
ξj,t [η (pj,tdj,t − Pthj,t −Qwt)− (1 + η)(1 + rt)P
∗
t xj,t] = 0.
The rst two KTCs together imply hj,t = λj,txj,t, where
λj,t ≡
α
1− α
(
1− ξj,tη − ξj,t
1− ξj,tη
)
(1 + rt)P
∗
t
Pt
.
By the rst onstraint then:
xj,t =
dj,t
ztλαj,t
. (9)
We assume intermediate good rms know demand funtions (5) and (9) and set their pries aordingly by
solving the following prot maximization problem:
max
pj,t
(
pj,t −
Pt
ztλ
α−1
j,t
− (1 + rt)
P ∗t
ztλαj,t
)
Ytp
1
σ−1
j,t −Qwt. (10)
The solution to this problem is given by
pj,t =
1
σztλαj,t
(λj,tPt + (1 + rt)P
∗
t ) . (11)
3.4 Input produers (exporters)
Eah ountry has a mass 1 of idential input good rms with tehnologies operating in a perfetly ompetitive
environment. Their tehnology uses apital (kt) and labor (lt) to generate output ft:
ft = k
γ
t l
1−γ
t , γ ∈ (0, 1),
An input produer seeks to solve the following optimization problem when supplying to domesti and foreign
intermediate good rms:
max
k,l
Pt ft − wtlt −Rtkt (12)
12
The usual FOCs are:
Pt fk,t = γPt(kt/lt)
γ−1 = Rt,
Pt fl,t = (1− γ)Pt(kt/lt)
γ = wt,
whih together imply an optimal apital-labor ratio equal to:
kt
lt
=
γ
1− γ
wt
Rt
.
3.5 Equilibrium
This eonomy is said to be in equilibrium if every period: given a state of the eonomy (z, z∗) and pries P ,
R, r, and w, funtions c(·), i(·), and s(·) solve the household's problem (3); given pries pj, demand funtions
dj solve nal good rm problem (6) and their prots are equal to zero; hj , xj and pj are the same for all j
and they solve the intermediate good rm problem (7) and (10); demands of labor and apital l and k solve
the maximization problem of input produers (12) and they have zero prots; good markets lear: c+ i = Y ,
dj = Fj , and f = h + x
∗
; labor markets lear: l + Q = n; apital markets lear: k = K; nanial markets
lear: s+ s∗ = P ∗x+ Px∗; and no-Ponzi-sheme onditions hold.
Given that this model does not have an analytial solution, we perform a alibration exerise in the next
setion in order to understand its quantitative properties by means of a numerial solution.
4 Quantitative exerise
4.1 International business-yle statistis
Table (1) presents several time-series properties for some of the main aggregates from the largest eonomies
in the OECD, whih we want to repliate with our model.
Some fats that stand out are the following: For almost every ountry, the volatility of onsumption is less
than the volatility of output; The average volatility of investment and imports are about three times larger
than that of output; The average volatility of net exports is about half the volatility of output; Domesti
orrelations between output, onsumption, investment, and imports are strong and positive; The orrelation
between output and net exports is negative in most ases; And there is no lear rank between the ross-ountry
orrelations of output, onsumption, and investment.
13
Table 1: International business yle statistis 1973-2010.
Standard deviation
a
Domesti orrelation International orr.
b
c i m nx tot y, c y, i y,m y, nx y, tot y c i
United States 0.80 2.86 3.27 0.36 1.64 0.93 0.95 0.79 -0.50 -0.08
Japan 0.73 2.00 3.42 0.52 3.55 0.81 0.86 0.59 -0.11 0.11 0.52 0.34 0.48
Germany 0.60 2.17 2.16 0.53 1.34 0.65 0.86 0.66 0.23 0.22 0.54 0.41 0.57
Frane 0.81 2.87 3.62 0.81 2.42 0.79 0.86 0.67 -0.20 0.03 0.50 0.42 0.36
United Kingdom 1.01 2.49 2.54 0.71 1.30 0.90 0.78 0.59 -0.25 0.05 0.64 0.51 0.50
Italy 0.94 2.32 3.53 0.93 2.10 0.68 0.82 0.64 -0.23 0.37 0.50 0.08 0.32
Canada 0.71 2.82 3.05 0.74 1.66 0.79 0.69 0.54 0.29 -0.21 0.68 0.57 0.36
Spain 0.92 2.76 3.52 0.96 2.84 0.85 0.91 0.71 -0.45 0.02 0.41 0.33 0.18
Australia 0.92 3.98 5.26 1.12 4.35 0.42 0.68 0.17 -0.00 -0.05 0.23 0.02 0.37
Mexio 1.03 3.28 4.90 0.81 2.50 0.95 0.88 0.66 -0.52 -0.38 0.22 0.09 0.15
Korea 1.05 2.70 2.65 1.18 1.28 0.81 0.89 0.66 -0.25 -0.29 0.26 0.15 0.26
Netherlands 0.75 2.64 1.84 0.77 0.66 0.70 0.82 0.59 0.05 -0.05 0.59 0.47 0.49
a
Relative to standard deviation of GDP.
b
Correlations with orresponding United States series.
1
4
4.2 Calibration
To proeed with the alibration we need preise denitions of maroeonomi aggregates in our model, so that,
we an math data to our simulations. We shall understand real GDP as the sum of private onsumption,
investment and exports minus imports: GDPt = ct + it + Px
∗
t − P
∗xt, and we will refer to net exports as
the result of the trade balane divided by GDP, i.e. nxt = (Px
∗
t −P
∗xt)/GDPt, where P and P
∗
are steady
state values or onstant pries for the model and the data respetively. Terms of trade will refer to the ratio
of import and export pries, so tott = P
∗
t /Pt, while the real exhange rate will refer to the ratio in the prie
level of intermediate goods, rert = p
∗
t /pt.
The model is alibrated to math features of the US eonomy over the 1973-2010 period as follows: we
set the disount fator β to the standard value of 0.99 to math an annualized interest rate of about 4%, the
apital depreiation rate δ is set to 0.025 to math an annualized depreiation rate of 10%, and the oeient
of risk aversion θ to −1. Following Mandelman et al. (2011) we assume a ost of holding savings (φ) equal to
one basis point. We set Q to obtain an import share of 15%,4 and µ to obtain a share of hours worked equal
to 0.34, both also standard targets in the literature. The apital adjustment ost parameter ψ is set so that
the standard deviation of investment is about three times that of output. The value of the trade elastiity σ
is set to 0.7ˆ to get an elastiity of substitution of 4.5. The parameter α is set so that the volatility of imports
is between 2 and 3 times that of output (Engel and Wang (2011)). γ is set to math an investment share of
22% of GDP. As a baseline we set η = 0.57, whih is the baseline value used by Amaral and Quintin (2010)
to math the ratio of nanial intermediation to GDP in US.
5
We will later perform a sensitivity analysis for
this parameter. The shok proess has the usual form,
log

zt
z∗t

 = A log

zt−1
z∗t−1

+

ǫt
ǫ∗t

 ,
where (ǫt, ǫ
∗
t ) is a vetor of normally distributed shoks, independent from past values. The ovariane matrix
of these shoks as well as the parameters in the transition matrix A are set after the values estimated by
Heathote and Perri (2002). The omplete parametrization of the model is given in Table 2.
4
Simulation results do not hange signiantly for dierent values of φ and Q, even if they are set to 0.
5
We performed a robustness test for the results in Table 3 and in the gures using dierentη. All the qualitative results are
robust for a wide range of values. The most relevant hanges are in the steady state and we report and analyse them in Setion
5.2.
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4.3 Simulation
We ran fty 300-period simulations of this eonomy, subjeted to produtivity shoks, and took the log of
eah series (exept for net exports, whih may be negative) and used a Hodrik-Presott lter for quarterly
data to remove their trends. We then averaged results from all fty simulations. Column 3 of Table 3 present
these averages ompared to their data ounterparts, whih have also been logged and HP-ltered as needed
for omparison. We also provide the results in Heathote and Perri (2002) in the last olumn.
Column 4 adds a redit shok to the baseline ase. In order to evaluate the eets of temporary redit
shoks we need to introdue a seond soure of unertainty in our model. The level of development of the
nanial system in a ountry and the strength of its institutions are aptured by the parameter η. However,
η an also apture hanges in risk positions taken by the nanial intermediaries. Hene, a larger η may
represent both a better developed nanial market and a higher level of ondene of banks on loan-repayment
possibilities. We shall assume that the redit tightness parameter η is now time dependent with mean η¯ and
a random omponent bt so that ηt = η¯bt. The shok proess is now
log


zt
z∗t
bt
b∗t


= A log


zt−1
z∗t−1
bt−1
b∗t−1


+


ǫz,t
ǫ∗z,t
ǫb,t
ǫ∗b,t


.
Table 2: Benhmark parameter values.
Parameter Value Soure or Target
Risk aversion θ −1 Bakus et al. (1994)
Disount rate β 0.99 4% annualized interest rate
Leisure share µ 0.46 Hours worked = 0.34
Depreiation rate δ 0.025 10% annualized depreiation
Adjustment ost ψ 0.85 Volatility of investment ≈ 2.9
Trade elastiity σ 0.77 Elastiity of substitution= 4.5
Fixed ost Q 0.001 15% import share of GDP
Capital share γ 0.41 22% Investment share of GDP
Home bias α 0.75 Volatility of imports ∈ (2, 3)
Cost of saving φ 0.01 Mandelman et al. (2011)
Produtivity proess Vǫ 10
−6
[
53 15
15 53
]
Heathote and Perri (2002)
Transition matrix A
[
0.97 0.025
0.025 0.97
]
Heathote and Perri (2002)
Calibrated to 1973-2010 US data.
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Following the estimations in Niepmann and Shmidt-Eisenlohr (2014), we alibrate the standard deviation
of the redit shok to 0.26 to math an eet of 1.5% hange in exports.6 Its persistene is set to 0.91 and
the ross-ountry orrelation to 0.76, as estimated in Gilhrist and Zakrajsek (2012)7 and Kollmann et al.
(2011) respetively. In Setion 5 we onsider and ompare redit and produtivity shoks of the same size
under dierent senarios and lay out their properties.
The baseline model does a good job at explaining some of the disrepanies between standard international
real business yle models and the data. Exessive onsumption smoothness is one suh ommon problem
that goes away. Rao (2008, 2010) suggests introduing an alternative speiation of household preferenes
to inrease onsumption volatility.
8
Our model, however, is apable of generating onsumption that is as
volatile as in the data with standard preferenes.
The volatility of imports is about two and a half times as large as the volatility of output. While it isn't
as large as in the data, it is quite an improvement over standard models, whih typially imply lower import
volatility than output volatility. Another signiant improvement an be seen in the volatility of terms of
trade, whih is larger than that of output and quite lose in magnitude to what we observe in the data. The
volatility of hours worked is low, but this is a ommon problem elsewhere in the literature.
Auto-orrelations of the series in the model are very similar to those in the data as are domesti orre-
lations. Our mehanism works as follows: when a positive produtivity shok hits the eonomy, households
have more inome left after onsumption. They deide to alloate these savings between importers that need
to nane international purhases and input produers (serving both domesti and foreign markets) that
need to nane apital. In any ase, the extra resoures make international trade heaper: savings devoted to
nane imports redue the total ost of imported goods and savings used to nane exporters apital allow
them to produe inputs at a lower ost, beoming more attrative to foreign ustomers.
The orrelation between output and the terms of trade is another ommon puzzle of international RBC
models. Looking at long time series this orrelation is typially negative (Mendoza (1995), Kehoe and Ruhl
(2008)),
9
while the standard models predit a positive orrelation. Our model predits a strong negative
orrelation, a sign onsistent with data, the opposite predition of standard models.
10
The same ours with
6
They nd that a negative trade nane shok of one standard deviation auses a redution of 1.5% in exports growth.
7
Comin and Gertler (2014) also uses this measure for trade nane.
8
GHH preferenes, as introdued by Greenwood et al. (1988), have the property that the marginal rate of substitution
between onsumption and leisure is independent of the onsumption level within the period, whih implies that there is no
inome eet on labor supply and hours worked respond more strongly to hanges in produtivity. Although this generates
volatility of onsumption more in line with the data, the unresponsiveness of labor supply to hanges in onsumption levels
appears to be empirially troublesome.
9
Note that Mendoza (1995) denes terms of trade as the inverse of our terms of trade.
10
Gruber and Arespa (2015) shows that this orrelation is strongly negative in earlier data and positive in reent years. He
suggests that in order to explain the negative orrelations of the past and their reent reversal, models of these type should
introdue the possibility that rms alter the quality and not just the quantity of their prodution, and that improvements in the
measurement of quality should be taken into aount. Our model here predits a strong negative orrelation, onsistent with
earlier data but inonsistent with reent values, the opposite predition of standard models.
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the orrelation between net exports and domesti output, whih is negative in the data and in our simulations
but positive in standard RBC models. The volatility of net exports is a little higher than in the data, but
remains lower than the volatility of output.
Another interesting result is that the ross-ountry orrelation of output is stronger than that of on-
sumption, as in the data. This is typially not the ase in the literature: Bakus et al. (1994) dub this the
onsumption/output anomaly. Our ross-ountry orrelations of onsumption are somewhat low. But most
importantly, the anomaly is gone. We believe this is an important feature of our model. Reall that only na-
tional households an invest in national apital. This is a apital restrition than prevents agents from sharing
domesti risk further and explains the low ross-ountry orrelation of onsumption.
11
The ross-ountry
orrelations of investment and hours worked are wrong, another ommon problem in this type of models.
The Bakus-Smith puzzle does not go away either, sine the orrelation between relative onsumption and
the real exhange rate is near one.
12
The onstrained intermediate good rms would like to use a larger share of foreign inputs. With a
positive produtivity shok intermediate rms are able to inrease their imports with the resoures freed by
the lower ost of domesti inputs. As a onsequene, net exports derease with output. After the shok,
both ountries inrease the demand for the heaper input. Foreign intermediate goods rms, whih were
more onstrained before the shok, rediret part of their demand towards the heaper input. As a result, P∗
dereases suiently to see a redution in the terms of trade, whih have a ounterylial behavior.
Whih features of the model make the quantity anomaly disappear? Column HP 2002 of Table 3 reports
the results for the bond eonomy in Heathote and Perri (2002). The omparison between their model and
ours hints us an answer. Their model diers in two relevant features: they have perfet ompetition for
intermediate good produers, whih ombine inputs in a CES, while we have monopolisti ompetition and
ombine inputs in a Cobb-Douglas and their rms are not redit onstrained. The ombination of these
two struture settings explains a dierent response of the eonomies to produtivity shoks. A produtivity
shok in the Home ountry auses a milder response in terms of output when ompetition is monopolisti.
This auses a smaller hange in relative pries and keeps a larger orrelation between ross-ountry outputs.
Moreover, with Cobb-Douglas preferenes in onsumption, Home and Foreign inputs are in the limit between
substitutes and omplements, while in a CES, it depends on the seleted elastiity of substitution. Any
hange in the relative use of inputs hanges their relative prie proportionally with a Cobb-Douglas, but not
with a CES. Altogether, these features make output aross borders more orrelated.
11
See Olivero (2010).
12
This is another anomaly that Gruber and Arespa (2015) suggests would go away if hanges in quality were taken into
aount.
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Table 3: Simulation results.
Data
b
Model
Standard deviations
a
73-10 Baseline Both shoks HP 02
Output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Hours 1.27 0.35 0.10 0.32
Consumption 0.80 0.96 0.49 0.52
Investment 2.86 2.90 2.31 2.73
Imports 3.27 2.50 1.66 0.79
Net exports 0.36 0.62 0.70 0.15
Terms of trade 1.64 1.72 0.26
Autoorrelations
Output 0.87 0.77 0.60
Hours 0.92 0.68 0.62
Consumption 0.87 0.73 0.84
Investment 0.90 0.72 0.18
Net exports 0.78 0.72 0.61
Terms of trade 0.81 0.68 0.66
Corr. with domesti output
Hours 0.89 0.69 0.56 0.97
Consumption 0.93 0.95 0.62 0.95
Investment 0.95 0.82 0.63 0.96
Net exports −0.43 −0.37 0.68 −0.65
Terms of trade −0.08 −0.36 −0.24
Cross-ountry orrelations

Output 0.58 0.73 0.10 0.17
Hours 0.42 −0.68 −0.10 −0.17
Consumption 0.36 0.22 0.92 0.68
Investment 0.30 −0.38 0.92 −0.29
Rel. onsumption-RER −0.71 0.98 0.34
a
Relative to the standard deviation of output.
b
Soure: OECD and FRED.

Refers to the orrelation of US series with series for an aggregate of Canada, Japan and
EU-15.
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EXPLAIN COLUMN WITH BOTH SHOCKS
We an onlude that having a redit onstraint allows us to evaluate the eets of hanging onditions
in nanial markets to both the amount as well as the dynami properties of trade. This is what we do in
the next setion.
5 How trade nane aets trade
5.1 Eets of a temporary redit shok
In light of all the empirial evidene in favor of the existene of a link between nane of trade and international
trade itself, how does our theoretial eonomy behave in response to an exogenous tightening of redit
onditions? In our model, household savings are the ruial soure of redit availability determining the
volume of trade attainable in this eonomy. As a benhmark ase, we set all orrelations and spillovers
between nanial and tehnology shoks to zero. Considering that nanial shok transmission aross borders
has been shown to be a very relevant phenomenon among modern apitalist eonomies in reent history, we
allow for a positive international orrelation between trade redit shoks, corr(εb, ε
∗
b) = 0.76, following the
estimations in Kollmann et al. (2011). The standard deviation and the persistene for the nanial shok
is assumed to be that of the produtivity shok to allow omparisons. We will later onsider the eets of
altering these assumptions.
Continuous lines in Figure 1 show the impulse responses in maroeonomi aggregates for the benhmark
ase. When a negative nanial shok hits our eonomy, GDP initially inreases and then falls below its
steady state value for the rest of the transition. The reason for this result is related to the hange in the
omposition of demand by intermediate good produers. When the nanial onstraint beomes tighter, rms
must redue their demand for imports. They substitute foreign inputs by relatively more expensive national
produts, pushing domesti prodution up and, hene, improving GDP. In antiipation of inreased demand
for domesti produts, there is an upsurge in investment ausing this eet. Moreover, households lose (at
least partially) one of their saving alternatives -the nane of imports-, so they devote more resoures to the
remaining option -investment in apital-. Foreign input produers lose part of the demand and redue pries,
P ∗t . However, Home input produers redue their pries further. The upsurge in investment inreases apital
aumulation just after the shok. This makes it heaper, generates a substitution from labor to apital
and redues the ost of prodution of the input and, therefore, its prie. As a onsequene, terms of trade
inreases (i.e., deteriorates).
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This leads to a fall in exports and, as a onsequene, in national GDP. Both imports and exports over
GDP are below the steady state during the transition. However, the negative eet of the nanial tightening
on imports is muh larger than on exports, so net exports over GDP improve. The interest rate redues also
beause intermediate rms demand less nanial resoures.
On the other hand, the tightening in the nanial onstraint aets produtivity: rms are fored to
hoose a less eient mix of domesti and foreign inputs due to the restrition. The obvious onsequene is
the inrease of intermediate goods pries, whih damage onsumption. Under the urrent parametrization,
the positive eet desribed above dominates the negative initially. However after a few periods, investment
ollapse and the initial surge in GDP disappears.
The dashed lines in the impulse-response gures above show that the balane between positive and
negative eets on maroeonomi aggregates ruially depends on the level of nanial shok persistene.
When persistene is low the surge in demand for domesti goods is muh more short-lived, and therefore
inreases in investment in antiipation of this surge are too weak to ounterat the negative eets of redit-
tightening on produtivity and exports. In this ase (0.80) the inrease in GDP is both milder and of shorter
duration, and of ourse the eonomy returns to the steady state muh more quikly than in the ase of high
persistene.
How are results aeted by a hange in the level of transmission of nanial shoks? Figure 2 illustrates
what happens if international orrelations drop from the benhmark ase of 0.70 to 0.50. This hange basially
aets the magnitude but not the shape of the response to the shok. In the benhmark ase, sine the shok
is transmitted abroad more forefully, foreign rms nd it more diult to nane imports and hene exports
fall signiantly more than in the ase of milder spillovers. With lower transmission of nanial shoks eets
over GDP and other maroeonomi aggregates are muh milder. We reah virtually the same onlusions if
instead of omparing eonomies with dierent levels of international orrelations we ompare eonomies with
dierent levels of nanial spillovers.
Similarly, our results are robust to hanges in the orrelation between nanial and tehnology shoks. If
these are dierent from zero, only the magnitude of the shoks is aeted, but not their qualitative properties.
A positive orrelation will aentuate the negative eets of a nanial shok on produtivity, as there will
be a loss in eieny due to both a less desirable mix of foreign and domesti inputs as well as a downgrade
in the tehnology used to ombine them.
Finally, how do the eets of redit shoks ompare to the eets of tehnology shoks? This is illustrated
in Figure 3 for the baseline parametrization of the redit shok; under these speiations, both shoks have
the same variane, and exept for the ase of GDP and investment, redit shoks have eets in the same
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Figure 1: Change in maroeonomi aggregates following a nanial shok for varying levels of nanial shok
persistene.
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Figure 2: Change in maroeonomi aggregates following a nanial shok for varying levels of international
orrelations.
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diretion to produtivity shoks. The most striking dierene though is in the magnitude of the eets, as
redit shok eets appear to be muh weaker for all aggregates onsidered. Put dierently, for the eets
of both shoks to be of roughly omparable magnitude, the variane of redit shoks would need to be muh
larger than that of produtivity shoks. This explains why the introdution of redit shoks appears to make
little dierene to the business yle properties of this eonomy, as pointed out in setion 4.3; these properties
are largely driven by utuations in tehnology. However, reent evidene by Helbling et al. (2011) show that
the insigniane of responses of global real variables to redit shoks ompared to produtivity shoks of
equal magnitude does not imply these are unimportant. Their variane deomposition suggests that redit
shoks ontribute as muh to utuations to the global GDP fator. Hristov et al. (2012) aount for loan
supply shoks, aggregate supply shoks, monetary poliy shoks and aggregate demand shoks for the Euro
Area ountries. They onlude that, in all member ountries, a sizable part of the drop in GDP growth (15%)
is attributed to loan supply shoks in the reent risis.
5.2 Eets of a permanent redit shok
We limit the analysis in this setion to omparative statis of a hange in the nanial situation of an eonomy
and by analyzing the qualitative onsequenes of a permanent tightening in η. Results are summarized in
Table 4.
First of all, a more onstrained nanial market redues GDP in the steady state. Optimal intermediate
rm demand alloation is bounded by the nanial onstraint, i.e., they would like to import more. Due to
this suboptimal demand alloation, the ost of prodution inreases and so do pries, whih, in turn, redue
onsumption and investment almost proportionally to GDP. This result is supported by several papers show-
ing a positive link between nanial development and eonomi growth (See Levine (2005) and Papaioannou
(2008) for a omplete survey on the issue.). Imports, on the other hand, deline more than GDP, moving
from a 12% to 8% when η hanges from .57 to .37, whih is approximately the 5% derease experiened by
US real imports over real GDP ratio from its peak to its valley in the reent risis. When we isolate the
nanial hannel by worsening importers aess to nanial resoures, independently of any other shoks,
imports are muh more damaged than GDP. This may be the ase beause imports are restrited and rms
need to turn to national prodution, partially osetting the downturn in GDP.
Sine the eonomy is less open in trade to foreign markets, ross-border spillovers are milder. This makes
all real variables more orrelated with national GDP. Net exports reat onsiderably and beome muh
more negatively orrelated with GDP. The lower interrelation auses ross-ountry orrelations to derease.
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Figure 3: Comparing redit and tehnology shoks.
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Table 4: Simulation results for dierent η
η
Steady state 0.77 0.57 0.47 0.37
Output 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.75
Consumption 0.68 0.65 0.63 0.59
Investment 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15
Imports/GDP 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.08
Standard deviations
a
Output 0.72 0.79 0.82 0.82
Consumption 0.55 0.56 0.54 0.52
Investment 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.44
Imports 0.25 0.17 0.14 0.10
Net exports 0.52 0.37 0.30 0.23
Terms of trade 1.44 1.61 1.70 1.77
Corr. with domesti output
Imports/GDP 0.75 0.86 0.91 0.93
Net exports −0.36 −0.56 −0.63 −0.68
Terms of trade −0.36 −0.56 −0.62 −0.68
Cross-ountry orrelations
Output 0.88 0.72 0.63 0.55
Consumption 0.63 0.57 0.55 0.53
a
In perentage.
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Although savings are still pooled aross borders, one of the international transmission mehanisms, trade,
has been partially bloked.
Regarding ountry unertainty, redit tightening inreases the volatility of GDP and terms of trade,
whereas imports, net exports and the real exhange rate are more stable. Consumption volatility has a
nonlinear response to redit tightening. Empirial researh draws ambiguous onlusions on the eets of
nanial market development on maroeonomi volatilities. Our results for GDP and onsumption are lose
to those of Kose et al. (2003a) and Kose et al. (2006). In their empirial analysis for 76 ountries, omprising
21 industrial and 55 developing ountries, they nd a negative eet on GDP volatility, in other words, more
developed markets suer from smaller output instability. On the onsumption side they show that nanial
development inreases onsumption volatility up to ertain threshold, following a nonlinear relationship, just
as we do. For instane, for η = 0.77, the standard deviation of onsumption is 0.0055, lower than that found
with η = 0.57, our baseline value. Eozenou (2008), on the other hand, nds onsumption volatility to inrease
when nanial markets are underdeveloped for a panel of 90 ountries. Investment volatility behaves in a
similar way for us.
We an explain the inreasing volatilities due to the lower possibilities of risk sharing among ountries. A
highly developed nanial market leads to more openness, beause rms are able to purhase more imports.
Therefore, both transmission mehanisms, trade and nanial relationships, omplement eah other. When a
ountry in a highly onstrained world is shoked by a positive hange in its tehnology, its rms an produe
heaper goods, whih pushes onsumption and investment and inreases output. However, when the shok
ours in a relatively unonstrained senario, foreign rms substitute national inputs by imports, whih are
now heaper, and benet from the shok. These spillovers ause a valuation eet on the prodution of the
shoked ountry, reduing the response of onsumption and investment. By the same token, GDP is also less
volatile thanks to the role of trade in risk sharing.
Indeed, the ombined eet of the level of trade transmission aross borders (or level of spillovers) and
the level of risk sharing an explain the nonlinear behavior of onsumption volatility. When a ountry is
relatively nanially onstrained and, hene, relatively losed, it suers or benets less from spillovers. This
makes it less volatile. On the ontrary, a relatively losed ountry has a worse level of risk sharing apability,
whih auses onsumption to be more volatile in front of domesti turbulene. Both eets are present and
at in opposite diretions: initially, when a ountry develops nanially, the strength of imported spillovers
makes it inreasingly unstable. However, for a ertain level of development, the risk sharing possibilities
oset the damage aused by spillovers, reduing onsumption volatility.
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6 Conlusions
Regardless of the sarity of quality data, the importane of trade nane for international trade has been
learly established in the empirial literature. This model provides theoretial support for the role of the
nanial hannel in explaining part of the large deline in the trade levels for many ountries following
episodes of nanial distress. Firms are bound by a nanial onstraint when they want to import. However,
regardless of the expliit nanial onstraint, whih aets importers, all rms in need for external nane
rely on households apability for saving, the suppliers of redit resoures. This apability is larger and, hene,
the onstraint is looser during eonomi expansions beause households are able to save more. Indeed, when
savings inrease, households alloate them between redit to importers and savings in the form of apital
whih is rented to exporters. Whatever the deision they take, they make international trade nane heaper.
A redit tightening episode worsens the apability of importers to get aess to foreign suppliers, who require
guarantees to ship their produts. This redues imports dramatially and, although output is also damaged,
some demand is realloated to domesti goods, ushioning part of the deline in GDP. Therefore, while
output, onsumption and investment deline at the same proportion after a redit tightening, imports are
hit muh harder.
Despite the importane of redit shoks to individual importers, their large-sale impat on the eonomy
appears to be limited at business yle frequenies ompared to produtivity shoks of the same magnitude.
Unless trade nane is muh more volatile than produtivity, it seems unlikely that trade nane ould play
a large role in short-run utuations of the eonomy. But, this larger volatility that makes the eets of
redit shoks sizable is, indeed, what evidene highlights (Reall Niepmann and Shmidt-Eisenlohr (2014),
Helbling et al. (2011) and Hristov et al. (2012)). The availability of trade nane is also important to the
long-run levels of trade, produtivity, and output of an eonomy. Improvements in trade nane an produe
large gains as well as more stability in prodution and onsumption as it allows for an inrease in trade
performane and a better mix of foreign and domesti goods used in produtive ativities.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst in the international real-business-yle literature
to onsider the role of trade nane. We go a step forward into the understanding of international trade
performane in a two-ountry, three-setor, miro-founded model by introduing a simple representation of
the nanial setor. Our model is able to shed light on many persistent ontraditions between theoretial
business-yle volatilities and their empirial ounterparts. First of all, the orrelations between net exports
and terms of trade with national output are negative in the model, mathing atual data and opposite
to standard RBC models. Seond, we nd that imports are more than twie as volatile as output in our
simulations. Though this is still low ompared to US data, it represents an important improvement, for
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previous models generally generate import volatility lower than GDP volatility. Terms of trade volatility in
the model is larger than that of GDP and loser to the atual value ompared to the existent literature. Our
model is apable of generating onsumption that is as volatile as in the data without the need to resort to
non-standard preferenes, thereby orreting the exess in onsumption smoothing found in past literature.
Furthermore, we overome the onsumption/output anomaly by produing ross-ountry orrelations in
onsumption smaller than in output, as in the data.
The model setup used in this paper is a suitable benhmark to explore the linkages between international
trade and trade nane in depth. This has been a step on this diretion and further researh is neessary
to fully understand the impliations of nanial development and nanial turbulene on international trade
patterns. Two reasonable extensions from this paper may be, rst, to introdue rm heterogeneity and explore
the relationship between rm size and trade nane, given that the empirial evidene suggests that smaller
rms are the ones that suer more from the tightening of redit during nanial rises; another important
soure of heterogeneity might be the possibility of intrarm redit for rms with international subsidiaries.
Finally, it would be interesting to allow for asymmetri ountries to understand the evolution of trade ows
among eonomi regions with dierent levels of nanial development.
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